By: Ahmed Moatasem
Why are you against the FFC (now “Taqaddum” / “Sumood”)?!
Why has public hostility toward the FFC (now “Taqaddum” / “Sumood”) emerged?
Since the launch of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance and its later transformation into “Taqaddum” and then “Sumood,” a deep rift has existed between their public statements and their actual actions — and between both and the lived experience of the street. This gap did not emerge from nowhere, but rather was the result of accumulated contradictions, blatant political manipulation, and disappointments that led many to view the FFC and the civilian coalition not as representatives of the revolution, but as entities detached from it — from being a revolutionary partner and comrade in the marches to becoming an adversary of the revolution.
The following points cover some of the events and stances that summarize this deviation which has fractured the relationship between the FFC and the masses:
1. Contradictory Statements: “No partnership with the military” — then partnership!
In the sit-in square at the army command, the FFC’s statements were strong, enthusiastic, and clear on the stage: no real partnership with the military; what’s happening is not negotiations for partnership, but merely “handover and takeover.”
But just days later, the language changed: the FFC began saying that the military would be part of the Sovereign Council and that their role would be merely ceremonial (as some leaders described it). This shift contradicted the aspirations of the revolutionary masses, who had hoped for full civilian representation — not partnership with the military.
“Seriously, Osli? You’re bringing me Hemeti to negotiate with?”
— Martyr Abdulsalam Kasha
This reversal and change in rhetoric created a sense of betrayal among the revolutionaries both inside and outside the sit-in. Instead of full civilian representation, the result was partnership with the military and the Janjaweed. At the same time, anti-military slogans were rising:
“Don’t turn your back to the military — they won’t protect you. Turn your back to the street — it will never betray you.”
Yet the FFC went in the opposite direction.
While people were still dealing with this disappointment, another shock came — that the partnership with the military wouldn’t be symbolic, but real. The conversation then shifted to the number of seats on the council — and what should have been a civilian majority ended up being an equal split.
2. Refusing to participate in power … then participating
One of the earliest promises made by FFC leadership — seemingly made in a moment of excitement — was that they would not participate in governmental power (ministries, governors). Ministries would be filled through real merit, and as for governors, “each state will nominate its own,” they said.
But after the partnership was established, we saw Ibrahim El-Sheikh in a ministry, Medani Abbas Medani in another, followed by governors and then Khalid Silaik also assuming a ministry. This raised questions about their commitment to the principle of “merit only.”
Did they mean professional merit — or partisan merit?
This contradiction — saying “we won’t enter government” and then being fully present — created a sense that the FFC was not rejecting power, but chasing it, even at the cost of the revolution and popular support.
3. After the sit-in massacre: Return to negotiations despite the atrocity
After the massacre at the sit-in near the army headquarters — along with other massacres — it was expected that the civilian coalition would reconsider its alliance and the principle of negotiating with the military altogether.
But shockingly, the FFC quickly announced its return to the negotiation table — with the same side that betrayed the revolutionaries during the holy month, committed a massacre, and carried out horrific crimes and violations.
Some FFC defenders tried to justify this by saying “partnership is the lesser evil compared to full military rule” or that the street had weakened after the massacre or was traumatized and no longer as strong.
But the response to the military and these doubts came in the June 30 million-man march — a political earthquake that proved the street was still alive and firmly holding onto the revolution and its demands.
At that point, the FFC had a chance to at least continue negotiations as the stronger party, imposing its and the street’s terms on the military.
The street was fully behind them — even those who weren’t, were against the military.
They had regional and international support (even if just publicly), the Islamists (NCP remnants) were in disarray and shocked.
What more did they need to put their foot down and dictate their terms?
4. Attempt to control resistance committees by merging them with neighborhood committees
During the transitional period, the FFC (through its cadres) tried to merge the resistance committees with the older neighborhood committees (the “Popular Committees”) into a single entity.
The declared goal may have been organizational, but the revolutionary street interpreted it differently — as an attempt to restrict the independence of resistance committees and control grassroots activism from the top down, which would weaken true public oversight.
This proposal did not pass, as it faced internal resistance from the “Trooss” (core activists) within the committees. The two groups had fundamentally different functions, even if they overlapped in some community service duties.
So it became a struggle between the power-holding cadre seeking to push their agenda and control the street — and the street’s vanguard demanding separation between political party activity and the work of grassroots committees, insisting on bottom-up authority and decision-making without top-down instructions.
5. The “Infiltrators and Agents” narrative — Recycling NCP tactics
Those who criticized or opposed the FFC within the civil movement were frequently labeled “Islamists,” “infiltrators,” “dividers of the revolutionary ranks,” or even “traitors to the revolution.”
This rhetoric wasn’t new in Sudanese politics, but it was rejected by FFC cadres before December — and by revolutionaries — because they recognized it as a continuation of the NCP regime’s oppressive playbook:
“You’re definitely being led by someone,”
“You’re an agent,”
— accusations thrown only by those with no argument or moral ground.
The result? A deepening rift between the FFC and the street, and an escalation in tensions.
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